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DAMAGES AS COMPENSATION FOR LOSS
ROBERT J. NORDSTROM*
Courts have adopted many "rules" to aid in measuring the size of
money recoveries. Some rules deal exclusively with contracts, others
with torts. Often, the classification is narrower with specific rules for
breaches of employment contracts, land contracts, sales contracts, con-
struction contracts, and so on. However, each of these rules attempts to
reflect basic principles which American courts believe will best promote
."fairness" and "justice."
The principle from which damage awards begin is that the damages
should be computed so that the dollars awarded will be an adequate com-
pensation for the loss which was suffered by the injured party.' The
objective of compensating for losses has been expressed so often by courts
and by legislatures2 that it has become natural for lawyers to think about
damages in these terms. Once it has been determined that the defendant
has breached some duty owing to the plaintiff (that is, once the question
of liability has been decided), the next-and almost automatic-question
becomes: what was the loss suffered by the plaintiff? The lawyer has a
practical justification for thinking in this sequence. Most of the rules
about damages rest upon the principle of compensating for losses and
the lawyer's job very often is that of advocating the application of those
rules to the facts of the case. There is no such easy justification, however,
for the lawyer or judge who is seeking to promote a specific rule of
damages. Is there any rational basis for promoting a principle which
stresses compensation of the injured party for his losses?
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE,
There is nothing inherent in a legal system which requires promotion
of the compensation principle. Early systems used money recoveries to
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
'Avery v. Fredericksen & Westbrook, 67 Cal. App. 2d 334, 154 P.2d 41
(1944); Brewster v. Van Liew, 119 Ill. 554, 8 N.E. 842 (1886); Hughett v.
Caldwell County, 313 Ky. 85, 230 S.W.2d 92 (1950); Neuman v. Corn Exchange
Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 51 A.2d 759 (1947); Reed v. Consolidated
Feldspar Corp., 71 S.D. 189, 23 N.W.2d 154 (1946).
'E.g., Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953); White &
Hamilton Lumber Co. v. Lynch, 159 Ga. 283, 125 S.E. 472 (1924); Shebester,
Inc. v. Ford, 361 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1961).
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assuage the injured party so that he would not resort to private war.3
As such, the goal of these systems was to preserve public order; whether
the recoveries also compensated for losses was incidental to their main
purposes. Other recoveries were shaped to punish the wrongdoer, un-
doubtedly with the notion that such punishment would deter other mem-
bers of society from engaging in activity which society believed contrary
to the best interests of its members. Most legal systems have also experi-
mented with fixed recoveries for specific wrongs.' These fixed recoveries
did not attempt to compensate for individual losses; at best, they may have
been viewed as compensatory for the aggregate of injuries occurring within
the society in which they were applied. Generally, the application of these
schedules to specific cases made the administration of the legal order less
time-consuming and probably less costly. There are, therefore, other
principles (e.g., preserving public order, deterring unlawful conduct, and
ease of judicial administration) which could have been accepted as the
"cardinal" purpose of money recoveries.' Why have American rules
about money recoveries stressed compensation for losses?
A partial answer to this question is that, as a matter of court hold-
ings, no one single principle has been accepted to the exclusion of all
others. For some wrongs, deterrence is still a key factor;6 for others, a
fixed recovery is preferred.7 This, however, is only a partial answer be-
cause the great bulk of litigated cases still expresses rules of damages
centering on the goal of compensating the plaintiff for his losses.'
'Nordstrom, Toward a Law of Damages, 18 WEST. RES. L. REV. 86 (1966).
'See R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM
OF THE COMMON LAW 46 (3d ed. 1927).
The idea that an injured party should be compensated for his losses is referred
to as the "fundamental and cardinal" principle of damages in Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 82, 281 S.W. 778, 785 (1926), and as the "cardinal"
principle in James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582 (1956).
Compensation is referred to as the "bottom principle of the law of damages" in
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 313 Ky. 85, 91, 230 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1950), and as a
"fundamental principle of damages" in J. B. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, 261 N.Y.
140, 144, 184 N.E. 737, 739, aff'd 290 U.S. 163 (1933).
' In addition to those cases in which punitive or exemplary damages are
awarded, cases like Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.W.
574 (1888) appear to be in point. There, the petition against the telegraph com-
pany alleged damages in the form of mental anguish. A demurrer was overruled,
the court stating that a holding of no liability for injury to feelings "would justify
the conclusion that the defendant might, with impunity, have refused to receive
and transmit such messages at all; and that it has the right in the future to do so
as it has done in this case, or, at least, that it cannot be required to respond in
damages for doing so." Id. at 706, 8 S.W. 577.
"Workmen's compensation does not compensate for injuries, Castro v. Bass,
74 N.M. 254, 258, 392 P.2d 668, 671 (1964).
'Lawrence v. Porter, 63 F. 62 (6th Cir. 1894): Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v.
2
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The compensation principle is-like many other general principles
of a legal system-based upon certain assumptions, the validity of which
has not been adequately tested by external data. The most probable as-
sumption underlying damage recoveries is that compensation for losses
is the fairest for both parties involved in a dispute. The injured party
is given what he lost-either by reason of a tort or a breach of contract
promise. With torts, the court seeks to place the injured party in the
same financial position which he occupied prior to the tort-that is, in
dollars and cents, to put him back where he was before the injury."0 With
contracts, the attempt is to place the nondefaulting party in the same
financial position which he would have occupied had the contract promise
been performed-that is, in dollars and cents, to put him ahead to where
he would have been in the event of full contractual performance." In
both cases, the injured party is made whole, at least as far as money can
be used as a substitute for the injuries. Courts and legislatures have as-
sumed that such a result is "fair" to the plaintiff.
It is more difficult to state the assumption involved when the same
problem is considered from the standpoint of the defendant. Perhaps the
assumption is that compensatory damages will deter the defendant (and
other members of society) from engaging in tortious conduct or in
breach of contract promises. 1 2 It can be argued that the rules of com-
pensatory damages remove any reason for engaging in unlawful conduct
because the defendant will be called upon to make good the losses which
Johnson, 141 Ky. 718, 133 S.W. 784 (1911). When the legal rules for measuring
damages run counter to the "paramount rule" of compensation, the legal rules
yield to the "principle underlying all such rules." Rutherford v. James, 33 N.M.
440, 443, 270 P. 794, 796 (1928).
, "The principle of compensation is a natural enough corollary of the fault
principle. If the defendant is a wrongdoer and he is to pay damages to an innocent
plaintiff, it seems eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put the
plaintiff, as nearly as may be, in the same position he would have been in if
defendant's wrong had not injured him. So deeply does this correspond to our
natural feelings that the basic principle has been taken pretty much for granted."
James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583 (1956).
"0 United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 899 (1958); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. De Pascale, 70 Ohio St. 179, 71 N.E.
633 (1904). But see Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries,
63 MicII. L. REV. 279 (1964).
" Woodburn Bros. v. Erickson, 230 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1956) ; United Protec-
tive Workers of Am. v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955); Coughlin v.
Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953); Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205
Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939); Spitz v. Lesser, 302 N.Y. 490, 99 N.E.2d 540
(1951); Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d 69 (1955); Orebaugh v.
Antonious, 190 Va. 829, 58 S.E.2d 873 (1950).
"2 See Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.W. 574 (1888).
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that conduct has caused. The difficulty here is that the principle of de-
terring future unlawful conduct would be better effectuated if recoveries
were multiples of (as, for example, ten or twenty times) the amount of
plaintiff's loss. Indeed, limiting recovery to the plaintiff's loss could in
some cases, place a premium on breach. For example, a builder who is
faced with a losing contract might be financially well advised to default
and to use his labor force to perform a profitable contract. There is a
chance that the builder will not be sued for breach; there is a further
chance that, if sued, the case can be settled short of the entire loss; but if
these chances fail to materialize, the only penalty incurred will be that
the builder must pay the plaintiff's loss-which could well have been
made up by the profitable contract. Therefore, the compensation prin-
ciple has only limited value in compelling performance of contracts; this
task is performed by other forces in the business community-forces
such as economics, good will, and pride ("I gave my word; thus, I will
do the job").
Perhaps the assumption is that awarding compensatory damages "in-
jures" the defendant to the same extent that the defendant wrongfully
injured the plaintiff. The extent of the plaintiff's injury is his loss;
thus, the defendant's injury ought to be measured by that loss. The most
exact method of injuring the defendant would, in many instances, be to
have the court do to the defendant what the defendant did to the plaintiff-
that is, retribution in kind. If the defendant had tortiously injured the
plaintiff, the defendant should be injured in the same way; if the defen-
dant had defaulted in a contract promise made to the plaintiff, a similar
contract to the advantage of the defendant should also be defaulted. There
are obvious difficulties with retribution in kind, and a more civilized
method of punishment has been chosen with dollars awarded against
the defendant." However, when the expanding role of insurance is con-
sidered, it is apparent that in a good number of cases it is not the de-
fendant who is being "injured" by a damage award. It therefore be-
comes difficult, as far as the defendant's interests are concerned, to state
the assumptions which are involved in the principle of awarding com-
pensatory damages, beyond a reaction that such awards are "fair" in
that they exact from the person at fault only the amount of the plaintiff's
loss-which, of course, is reaching a conclusion by reasoning in a circle.
1" "The judgment for damages is substituted for the wrongdoer's duty to per-
form the contract." Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 598, 262 P.2d 305, 311(1953).
4
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Perhaps at least two of the ideas in the prior paragraphs express the
assumptions underlying a principle of compensating for losses, as well as
such assumptions can ever be stated. Such awards are fair to the plaintiff ;
he receives his losses. Such awards are fair to the defendant; he was at
fault but is not penalized for his actions. When cases arise in which com-
pensation for loss is not the fairest method of determining the size of the
money recovery, another principle is selected as the basis of awarding
damages. However, in the large majority of cases, the attempt to award
compensation-and only compensation-has been the objective of the
damage rules which courts have developed.
LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION OF THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
The compensation principle is an objective which courts attempt to
reach through the adoption of several damage rules. It is, however, an
objective which is probably seldom realized in its application to specific
cases. The reasons that the compensation principle is seldom achieved are
inherent in the nature of the problem presented for determination by the
court. Each case involves a factual pattern with many variables. These
variables affect the dollar recovery awarded and may prevent the award
from amounting to full compensation and no more than full compensa-
tion. Before the compensation principle is applied in any case, the court
must find:
1. "Fault" on the part of the defendant. Except for cases involving
strict liability, some kind of "fault" on the part of the defendant must be
found before an award of compensatory damages is given. For torts, the
fault may consist of either intentional or negligent action (or inaction).
For contract cases, the equivalent of fault is found in the action (or in-
action) which amounts to a breach of contract promise. The fault
of the defendant may be clear, both as to the facts and the law; or the
fault of the defendant may be a conclusion reached on a bare prepon-
derance of the evidence and only after resolution of genuine doubts as to
whether the rule of law was intended to apply to the case before the court;
or the fault of the defendant may be determined on some other combina-
tion of these factors. Since the compensation objective is a part of the
process of determining liability, decisions as to defendant's fault un-
doubtedly affect the size of the award. 4
" That evidence of the defendant's fault affects the size of the award is recog-
nized in those cases in which the court refuses to grant a new trial for damages
only, but requires the entire case to be retried. "While the decisions are some-
what in conflict the cases may be reconciled on the grounds that a new trial on the
5
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2. Causation between the breach of duty and the loss. There are
many ways to frame substantive rules of law. One common way is to
state that the court must find that the defendant, without legal justifica-
tion, has breached some legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
and that the breach of duty resulted in some loss to the plaintiff. The
problem-now of causation-may be contested and the court must decide
just what losses of the plaintiff were caused by the defendant's wrongful
act. Such a decision is bound to be artificial because many factors, among
them the wrongful activity of the defendant, combined to produce the
claimed loss. Injury is not the result of a single act. Therefore, when
a court states that the defendant's wrongful activity caused the plaintiff's
loss, it is not expressing a law of physics or of the natural order of the
universe ;"5 it is expressing a policy determination that the defendant ought
to pay for the loss.16 The more strongly the judge feels about the "ought,"
the more likely he is to allow the jury to speculate as to items of claimed
question of damages alone will be granted when liability is not contested or has
been clearly proved by the plaintiff so that the issues may be deemed separable; on
the other hand when liability is contested and the issues are so inextricably en-
twined that a fair trial could not be given one of the parties on the issue of damage
alone then a new trial will be ordered on all issues." Tovrea Equip. Co. v. Gobby,
72 Ariz. 38, 42, 230 P.2d 512, 515 (1951).
15 "According to the orthodox view, whether event A is the cause of event
B is a question of objective fact to which all value judgments are irrelevant. What,
then, we may ask, is the cause of the injury when a plaintiff and his car have been
smashed up by defendant's car ? The location and speed of the defendant's car cer-
tainly contributed to the accident. So, too, did the location and speed of the plaintiff's
car; if plaintiff had stayed in bed instead of driving, he would not have been hurt.
Relevant also are the durability and tensile strength of the two cars, the width of
the road, the character of the road-surface, the weather, and a host of other more
or less important facts. How can we possibly pick out one of these facts, or any
combination of them, and say: 'This was the cause of the accident?' Certainly
there is no rule of physics, no rule of engineering, and no rule of logic that will
enable us to reach such a result.
"What do we actually do? If it turns out that plaintiff was driving on the
right side of the road and that the defendant was driving on the left side of the
road, we say that the defendant's driving on the left side was the cause of the acci-
dent, unless the case arises in England, in which case we say that the plaintiff's
driving on the right side was the cause of the accident. From the standpoint of
logic or physics the physical collision of the cars had exactly the same physical
antecedents whether the collision occurred in England or America. But from the
standpoint of the law, the judgment of 'wrongness' or 'carelessness' is an essential
part of the judgment that attributes the cause of the accident to some human act.
Without such standards, we should find in every accident only the intersection of
an infinity of strands of occurrences reaching back into the past without end."
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 252 (1950). See also,
B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 83-85 (1928), and the discussion in
J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 236-239 (3d ed. 1937).
1 Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Edger-
ton, Legal Causes, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 343 (1924).
6
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damages. The less strongly the judge feels about the "ought," the less
likely he is to allow the jury to consider items of claimed damages. Al-
though appellate courts talk in terms of causation and not compensation,
this policy decision-whether expressed in terms of legal cause, cause in
fact, or damages resulting from breach-affects the size of the award.'
That causation between conduct and injury is a policy decision, and
not a rule of inflexible application, is highlighted by the doctrine of
proximate cause. According to this doctrine, only those injuries which
are the proximate result of the defendant's conduct will be compensated,
while remote consequences will not be compensated.' It therefore be-
comes important to distinguish the proximate from the remote cause.
The difficulty is that there is no inherent method of making this distinc-
tion, and definitions are of little help. The common statement that a
proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken'by any efficient -intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the injury would not have occurred' 9 only emphasizes
", Once a court is convniced that the defendant's wrongful conduct (e.g., breach
of contract) caused some loss, the court is more likely to let a jury speculate as
to the actual amount of those damages, Parker v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125, 188 N.E..
502 (1934), than if it has serious doubt as to whether the conduct caused any loss,
New England Iron Works Co. v. Jacot, 223 Mass. 216, 111 N.E. 867 (1916). Cases
are collected in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932).
18 Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 644 (8th Cir. 1957) (breach
of contract) ; In re Estate of Talbott, 184 Kan. 501, 508, 337 P.2d 986, 991 (1959)
(breach of contract; "the measure of damage is such as are the natural, direct
and proximate result of the breach"); Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 428,
101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960) (tort; no recovery to be allowed for remote, con-
jectural, or speculative damages); Belisle v. Wilson, 313 S.W.2d 11, 17 (Mo.
1958) (tort; "of course a person suffering from a prior impaired condition may
not recover for a result not a natural and direct, or proximate, result of the
negligence of the defendant") ; Pierson v. Hermann, 3 Ohio App. 2d 398, 402, 210
N.E.2d 893, 897 (1965) (tort; "if the plaintiff has suffered a measurable injury,
the defendant is liable for all direct or proximate results .... ").
"0 Either the statement in the text or slight variations thereof appear in many
cases. For example, see Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480, 484, 223 P.2d
389, 391 (1950); Burr v. Clark, 30 Wash. 2d 149, 158, 190 P.2d 769, 774 (1948).
Other definitions have been tried. Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 191 (Fla.
1953) (material and substantial factor of injury) ; Cedar Falls & Northern R. R.,
244 Iowa 1364, 1372, 60 N.Y.2d 572, 576 (1953) (act and injury must be a
natural whole); Greenwood v. Vanarsdall, 356 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. App. 1962)
(injuries must have immediate affinity with wrongful conduct). All such defini-
tions fall short of stating a rule of universal application. Perhaps the best that
can be done is to state that damages will be awarded only when the defendant's
conduct is the "legal cause" of the plaintiff's injuries. Such a statement emphasizes
that there is no single rule or definition which can be applied and that the problem
involved is that of determining whether the defendant ought to be financially re-
sponsible for the losses which occurred. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,
152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
7
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that the findings of proximateness (like the finding of cause in fact) is a
policy decision.
This, however, does not mean that courts should discard the search
for some method of distinguishing between those injuries for which com-
pensation will be granted and those for which no compensation will be
allowed. Courts properly do not believe that a defendant ought to be
liable for all of the ruinous consequences which, as a matter of hindsight,
can be attributed to the defendant's wrongful conduct.2" They have
stated this conclusion in different forms, one of which is in terms of
proximate causation. Properly understood, this statement can be a useful
tool in determining and awarding damages. 1
As far as the compensation principle is concerned, there is another
way in which the doctrine of causation should be considered. The fact
determiner can never be certain that the loss complained of would not
have occurred even if the defendant had performed the duty which he
owed the plaintiff. When a court in a contract action awards damages
measured by the value of gains prevented, there is the possibility that
other events may have prevented the plaintiff from realizing the
gains for which he is now suing.22 Had the defendant performed his
promise, the plaintiff would have received the promised consideration.
Thereafter, the plaintiff may have mismanaged what he received or may
have entered into other arrangements (which he did not enter into be-
cause he did not receive the defendant's performance) which in fact
would have prevented the gains which he is now awarded.2" When a
20 "We suppose that, given sufficient information, imagination, and stratospheric
reasoning, by omitting any attention to the boundaries which the courts and
treatises attempt to set by using the words 'proximate,' 'natural and probable con-
sequence,' 'unbroken chain of circumstances,' 'efficient intervening cause,' and
'remote,' the wrongs which any of us may do can be traced in the ultimate causal
connection with injury to a great many others, even those yet unborn; but the
law, although a great moral force in itself, does not permit the recovery of dam-
ages except for those injuries which have an immediate affinity with actions
which produce the wrong." Greenwood v. Vanarsdall, 356 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo.
App. 1962). The most famous case supporting the statement in the text is Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
"1 "The purpose of the definition of the term [proximate cause] is to keep
jurors within correct legal bounds." Danielsen v. Eickhoff, 159 Neb. 374, 377,
66 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1954).
2 Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64 HARV.
L. REv. 317 (1950).
3 This factor is emphasized by some courts when they have decided not to
award a new business the profits claimed to be lost by reason of a breach of con-
tract or a tort. "Plaintiffs, however, had no assurance that the venture would
not prove to be a failure." Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63,
67, 119 N.E. 227, 228 (1918). Subsequent events in that case indicated that, in
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol2/iss1/3
DAMAGES AS COMPENSATION FOR LOSS 9
court in a personal injury case awards damages measured by the value
of plaintiff's lost income, there is a possibility that, had the tort not oc-
curred, the plaintiff may have died or lost his job for reasons wholly
unconnected with the tort-or the plaintiff may have unexpectedly been
able to accumulate a much larger sum of money than his lost income,
simply because he was not lying in a hospital bed. Similar possibilities
exist in an action for negligent destruction or conversion of property.
Had the tort not occurred, the plaintiff would have had full use of the
property and may have lost it or destroyed it through his own negligence
or may have been able to use it to an unexpected advantage. These are
all possibilities. The court can never be certain that it is compensating
for losses caused by the defendant's wrongful activity. The most that the
compensation principle can mean is that the law attempts to compensate
for probable losses.24
3. The size of the loss. Measuring losses is an imprecise process.
Not too many difficulties are presented if the court must measure the
value of lost income for a relatively short period of time prior to the
trial of the case. However, such "simple" problems as determining the
value of Blackacre or of a used automobile begin to create difficulties and
to make exact computation more doubtful. When the problem becomes
more complicated and the court must determine the value of gains, such as
profits, which the plaintiff had hoped to receive but did not because of the
tort or the breach of contract, the chances of compensation-and no more
than compensation-become slight, indeed. Finally, when damages are
awarded for pain and suffering or for mental anguish, any equivalence
between the dollars awarded and the loss suffered is doubtful: the possi-
bility that the award is compensation, and no more than compensation,
fact, the venture did not prove to be a failure. Nevertheless, lost profits were
denied.
24 Another type of case in which compensation is difficult to measure (and not
certain as to amount) but where courts affirm reasonable jury verdicts is the
wrongful death action for the negligent killing of a minor. Typical of the language
found in these cases is: "In making this determination [the amount of damages],
no exact rule of reasoning or computation is afforded by law, but the jury has no
arbitrary discretion. The finding should be the result of a fair consideration of
all the matters that should, under the circumstances of the particular case, properly
enter into the estimate and computation. . . . In cases of this character it is
left for the jury in the fair exercise of sound discretion in the light of all the
information properly available, to ascertain and fix the probable amount of the
damage sustained by the plaintiff, or by those whom he represents, 'reserving at all
times the authority of the court to guard against manifest injustice by way of ex-
cessive estimates.'" Florida F.C. Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 105-06, 64 So. 504, 505
(1914). See Comment, Damages in Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 420 (1968).
9
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for the injury received is all but gone.25 Thus, because compensation is
awarded in dollars and because many losses are not easily translated into
dollars, exact compensation for losses is seldom achieved.
There are, therefore, many variables in each factual situation. These
variables affect the size of the recovery.26 Assuming for the moment that
there is some objective standard by which exact compensation can be
measured (either in theory or by reference to an omniscient source), still
actual damage recoveries would only approximate the results dictated by
such a standard. The court, however, has no infallible and objective
standard which it can use to measure compensation." Thus, doing the
best job which it can do, the court attempts to compensate for the probable
losses which it finds probably resulted from the probably wrongful con-
duct of the defendant.2 8 The court's findings are based, not on a require-
ment of certainty of the proof, but on a determination that it is more prob-
able than not (1) that the defendant did the wrongful act complained of,
(2) that the act caused losses to the plaintiff, and (3) that those losses
when measured in dollars are valued at the amount of the award. The
compensation principle, more accurately stated, is an objective of com-
pensating for probable losses suffered by the plaintiff.
Even with its shortcomings, compensation of the plaintiff remains
the best expression of the goal of the damage remedy. This principle
"See John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1964).
2" Those thousands of cases which hold that an appellate court should not
disturb a reasonable jury verdict are a recognition that there is not a set standard
for determining compensation and that the variations in fact patterns affect the
recoveries. These cases include: Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So. 2d 297 (1963) ;
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1961); Ward v. Chicago Transit Auth., 52 Ill. App. 2d 172, 201 N.E.2d 750
(1964); Pearson v. Hanna, 145 Me. 379, 70 A.2d 247 (1950); Porter v. Funk-
houser, 79 Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216 (1963) ; McPike v. Scheuerman, 398 P.2d 71
(Wyo. 1965).
2 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 508, 364 P.2d 337,
343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1961) ("There are no fixed and absolute standards
by which an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent of the dam-
ages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the wrongful act of the defendant"):
Tedrov v. Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc., 254 Iowa 193, 202, 117
N.W.2d 62, 67 (1962) ("There is no rule of thumb by which the amount [of
damages] may be measured") ; White v. Rapid Transit Lines, Inc., 192 Kan. 802,
806, 391 P.2d 148, 151 (1964) ("The only standard for evaluating the amount of
damages resulting from an injury is such amount as reasonable persons estimate
to be fair compensation for the injury").
"The words "probable" and "probably" are (probably) as meaningless as
the words of the compensation principle discussed in this section. They were
used (and italicized), however, to emphasize that there is no certain yardstick
against which the "rightness" or "wrongness" of the size of an award can be
measured. The compensation principle, therefore, is not a rule-but an objec-
10
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forms a limiting force on jury verdicts and indicates that American ideas
of justice begin by placing emphasis, not on retribution, but on compen-
sation.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATION
A reading of the court opinions discussed in the prior sections would
lead an observer of the American legal system to conclude that compensa-
tory damages are the sole money recovery awarded by courts in this
country. Such a conclusion would, of course, be erroneous because it ig-
nores the many cases in which recovery is based upon other principles.
In some cases, only nominal damages are awarded. However, these de-
cisions can be rationalized with the objective of compensation in that
nominal damages are awarded (1) when there has been a violation of a
legal right and that violation has produced no present loss, or (2) when
some compensable injury has been shown but the amount of the damage
has not been proved. Exemplary (or punitive) damages are awarded to
punish the defendant, perhaps with the hope of deterring others from com-
mitting a similar offense in the future. Although there are a few cases
which attempt to justify exemplary damages on the basis that they are
really compensatory in nature,2" the award of exemplary damages gen-
erally has punishment-rather than compensation-as its objective.3"
There is another group of cases which is not accounted for by the
compensation principle: that group in which the plaintiff's recovery is
measured not by plaintiff's losses but by the defendant's gains. The types
of cases in which this measure is a permissible alternative to compensa-
tion are still undefined although they center loosely around what has
tive. The adequacy or inadequacy of a damage award is measured, in the first
instance, by the jury's sense of values as to the claimed injury, and controlled,
in later instances, by the judges' senses of values as to whether the award falls
within an ill-defined area of reasonableness.
9 Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930) ; Craney v. Donovan,
92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917); Lucas v. Michigan C. R.R., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W.
1039 (1893); Tenhopen v. Walker, 96 Mich, 236, 55 N.W. 657 (1893); Bixby
v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873). Cases are
collected in Annot., 16 A.L.R. 793 (1922), s. 123 A.L.R. 1121 (1939),
" "The theory of the infliction of punitive damages is that they are imposed as
a sort of civil punishment by reason of the aggravated circumstances attending
the injury, and as a sort of civil penalty so that its infliction may operate as a de-
terrent of similar occurrences in the future." Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Johns'
Adm'x., 155 Ky. 264, 159 S.W. 822, 824 (1913). The fact that defendant
has already been punished for the crime does not bar exemplary damages. Morris
v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
11
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come to be called the law of restitution."' Several restitutionary remedies
have been developed, some giving specific relief and others awarding a
money recovery.
32
The idea of restitution is that of restoring the parties to the financial
position they occupied prior to the tort or breach of contract. Such an
idea is probably one of the oldest in any legal system. As with the com-
pensation principle, however, the theoretical justification for such a
principle is assumed; its fairness to the parties and value to the economic
system have not been tested or opened to critical examination. Justifica-
tion has been rested on the reaction which the majority of people appear
to have to the statement of the restitution objective. The plaintiff has
suffered a loss. The defendant has received a gain. What could be
"fairer"-what is more theoretically sound-than to remove that gain
from the defendant and return it to the plaintiff? As was stated in the
Digest of Justinian: "For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made
richer through another's loss."33 The basis of restitution remedies rests
in the nature of the principle.
The Digest of Justinian did not attempt to state an inflexible rule
about money recoveries. In not all instances in which a person is made
richer through another's losses will it be "inequitable" for the person
81 The basic idea underlying restitution in Anglo-American law is usually at-
tributed to Lord Mansfield's opinion in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97
Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). For a discussion of the history of restitutionary
remedies, see J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, Chs. I and II (1951); Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1888).
8 There are several restitutionary remedies, the most common of which are
the common counts. See discussion in Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273
P.2d 15 (1954); and Dentists' Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 119
N.Y.S.2d 570, aff'd, 306 N.Y. 624, 116 N.E.2d 238 (1953). These remedies are
often referred to as quasi-contractual. Also available are: (1) constructive trust,
Nebraska Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71 N.W. 294 (1897); Matthews v.
Crowder, 111 Tenn. 737, 69 S.W. 779 (1902); (2) equitable lien, Republic
Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935); Simmons v.
Shafer, 98 Kan. 725, 160 P. 199 (1916) ; (3) subrogration, Emmert v. Thompson,
49 Minn. 386, 52 N.W. 31 (1892); Whalen v. Schumacher, 176 Wis. 441, 187
N.W. 169 (1922); cases collected in Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1396 (1931); and (4)
equitable accounting, J. DAwsoN AND G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 77
(1958). Modern versions of ejectment and replevin (see Ablah v. Eyman, 188
Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961)) may also be restitutionary in nature. Restitu-
tionary remedies are discussed in the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 4, 160
et seq. (1937).
"8 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, 12, 6, 14 (Pomponius), as quoted in J. DAWSON,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (1951). 4 S. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 141 (1932), offers
this translation: "For it is only in accordance with natural equity that no one
should profit pecuniarily by the injury of another." Other translations, similar to
the two quoted are available in other sources.
12
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to retain those riches. The restitution principle does not require each
agreement to be measured to determine whether both parties received
mathematical equivalents at the time set for performance. If a purchaser
has agreed to pay an amount of money for Blackacre, a used automobile,
or a new invention, and it turns out that that amount of money is more
(or less) than the "value" of Blackacre, the used automobile, or the in-
vention, the restitution principle has not yet been applied to equalize the
value of the promises.
That the statement from Justinian is only a principle-and not a rule-
should be clear by considering its breadth. Standing alone, the state-
ment could equally be a part of a preamble to a criminal code, to a list of
duties for trustees, or to a summation of rules about property. In fact,
the restitution objective has probably been used to support many legal
rules which are stated to rest on other assumptions.3 1 When, however,
ideas of restitution are applied to money recoveries, the emphasis is
placed not on the size of the plaintiff's losses-as it is with the compensa-
tion principle-but on the amount of defendant's gains. 35 Notice that
the thrust of restitution is that no one ought to be made richer-in short,
that the defendant should not gain. Before the gain is inequitable, though,
the gain must be generated by the plaintiff's loss. 36 As neither "loss" nor
"gain" is defined, and because no attempt is made to explain the causal
relation which must exist between the loss and the gain, the statement
set out above should be read as a principle and not as a rule about dam-
ages.
In many cases, the compensation and restitution principles reinforce
each other. Those are the situations in which the plaintiff has suffered
a pecuniary loss by reason of the defendant's invasion of a legal right
" See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401
(1959).
"An example is Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. App. 1933), where the
plaintiff was allowed to recover a sum of money in excess of the contract price.
Other examples are found in Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961) ;
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946); RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 150 et seq. (1937).
" "It has been held that it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant has committed a tort whereby he has enriched himself. It must further
appear that what has been added to the defendant's estate has been taken from the
plaintiff's. That is to say, the facts must show, not only a plus, but a minus quan-
tity." W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 163 (1893). Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch.
Div. 439 (1883), was the only authority cited to sustain the "plus-minus" argu-
ment. See the discussion in Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39
S.E.2d 231 (1946). Cf. City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 30 N.E.2d
278 (1940).
13
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of the plaintiff, and the defendant has received a gain equal to the
plaintiff's loss. In these cases it makes no difference whether the legal
system compensates the plaintiff for his loss or removes the defendant's
gain-that is, it makes no difference in the result of that particular case.37
There are, however, other cases in which the loss which the plaintiff has
suffered is substantially less than the defendant's gain. Sometimes the
loss is found only in the invasion of a legal right; yet restitution has been
allowed to disgorge the gain of the defendant. 8 Likewise, in a proper case
the restitution principle has been applied even though the causal relation
between the loss and the gain has become extremely attenuated.
3 9
The Restatement of Restitution has rephrased the Digest of Justinian
in terms of unjust enrichment: "A person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other. °
" Cases involving conversion of property commonly involve an equality be-
tween what was taken and what was lost. In measuring the recovery for the
unlawful taking, the compensation and restitution principles enforce each other.
However, the theory on which plaintiff seeks recovery is important to the evi-
dence which should be introduced. If he is proceeding on a theory of quasi-con-
tract, the plaintiff should show the value to the defendant and not rely on the
cost of the goods to the plaintiff. Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929). The
cost to the plaintiff may, however, be evidence of the value to the defendant.
United States ex rel. Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d
606 (2d Cir. 1944); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231
(1946).
There may, in a specific case, be many reasons--other than the measure of
recovery-for selecting a restitutionary remedy. For torts, the restitutionary
remedy often chosen is quasi-contract. Because courts treat this remedy as con-
tractual, certain procedural advantages may be received by the party selecting
restitution. Sometimes the restitutionary remedy is equitable (as with construc-
tive trust or equitable lien) and advantages of having the case "in equity" may
flow to the party selecting restitution. These advantages are outside the scope
of this article; thus, no attempt is made to collect cases dealing with the prob-
lems. However, they may include: the contractual statute of limitations which
is generally longer than the tort statute [House, Unjust Enrichment: The Ap-
plicable Statute of Limitations, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 797 (1950) ; York, Extension of
Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 499 (1957)]; the
contractual rules as to setoff and counterclaim [Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1929); C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 103 at 660-665 (2d ed. 1947) (here-
inafter cited C. CLARK)]; the contractual rules as to joinder of causes of action
[C. CLARK § 69 at 451-452] ; the contractual rules as to survival of causes of action
[Treasurer & Receiver General v. Sheehand, 288 Mass. 468, 193 N.E. 46 (1934);
Evans, A Comparative Study of the Survival of Tort Claims for and against
Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REv. 969 (1931)]; and the right to
claim ownership or a lien in a specific asset, thereby obtaining priority over other
claimants [see e.g., cases collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 672 (1952)].
8 Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575
(S.D. N.Y. 1920); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652
(1946).
"'See King County v. Odman, 8 Wash. 2d 32, 111 P.2d 228 (1941).
o RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
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Although this statement appears more like a rule than does that in the
Digest, a moment's reflection will make it clear that all that the Restate-
ment has done is to state a principle around which more precise applica-
tions can be justified. Whether there has been an unjust enrichment de-
pends upon whether the defendant has received a benefit." Since "unjust,"
enrichment," and "benefit" are words filled with policy determination and
can be expanded or contracted in content to meet the needs of an individ-
ual case, the sentence quoted above from the Restatement is merely an
approval of the restitution objective. 42
Therefore, specific rules about money recoveries reflect varying
policies, sometimes contradicting and sometimes reinforcing each other.
Those policies which can be identified include: (1) awarding at least
nominal damages, even though none has been proved, to vindicate the
invasion of a legal right; (2) compensating for probable losses; (3) pre-
venting unjust enrichments; and (4) punishing wrongdoers with the
hope of deterring the defendant and others from committing similar ac-
tivity.
CHOICE OF THE MEASURE OF RECOVERY
The struggle of the Anglo-American judicial system to free itself from
the writ system has involved a long and complicated history. For several
hundred years, the form of action controlled the development of legal
thinking as the attention of both the practicing lawyer and the judge was
constantly directed at the writ selected by the plaintiff to institute legal
" Id. comment a.
42 Dawson, Restitution or Damages., 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959); York,
Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499
(1957).
Restitutionary remedies are also available even though there is no "fault" on
the part of the defendant. Thus, plaintiffs who themselves have breached their
contract promise have been allowed to recover the benefit received by the defen-
dant. As to the right of a defaulting vendee to recover payments made prior to
breach, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1954). As to the right of a building contractor
who is in default to recover for work done prior to the breach, see Nordstrom
and Woodland, Recovery by Building Contractor in Default, 20 OHIO ST. L.J.
193 (1959). As to the right of a defaulting buyer of goods to recover for pay-
ments made prior to the breach, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718 (2)
and (3), hereinafter cited as UCC; Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15, 74 (1956). Like-
wise, where a contract has been rendered impossible of performance, restitution
may provide a basis for recovering benefits conferred. 2 RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 468 (1932). Illegality of the contract causes more difficult problems, Id.§§ 598-609.
'" There are many treatises and countless cases dealing with the growth of the
common law writ system. Among the treatises are J. AMES, Appeals, in LECTURES
IN LEGAL HISTORY 47 et seq. (1913); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
15
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proceedings.43 Choice of the wrong writ was often fatal to the plaintiff's
cause of action and, therefore, to his recovery of damages. Thus, during
this period in legal history, the form of action was exceedingly important
to the amount of recovery.44
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, courts and legislatures have
attempted to minimize the importance of the form of action. The FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE represent the ultimate position in eliminating
the formalities of the kind of writ to be chosen by the plaintiff in stating
that there "shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' 45
These provisions are based upon a belief that the judicial process should
not be overly technical in determining the justice of the complaining
party's basis for relief;46 justice depends upon the substance of the claim
and not upon the formalities by which the court's attention is directed
to the claim.47
Rules of damages have not escaped this belief that the form of action
chosen should not control the substance of the claim. Cases contain state-
ments to the effect that the amount of recovery should not and does not
depend upon the form of the plaintiff's action. Such a case is Baker v.
Drake48 where suit was brought against stock brokers for a sale of 500
shares of railroad stock, which sale plaintiff alleged was unauthorized. It
was not clear whether the suit was for conversion or breach of contract.
LAW 627 et seq. (3d ed. 1923); 1 J. CHITrY, PLEADING (16th Am. ed. 1879);
R. Perry, COMMON-LAW PLEADING: ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES (1897). An
excellent law review appears in Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass
(Pts. 1-2) 33 YALE L.J. 799 (1924) and 34 YALE L.J. 343 (1924). A condensed
statement is included in C. CLARK, §4 at 12-15. Although most American juris-
dictions have now discarded the forms of action as used at common law, their
impact on modern legal thinking should not be underemphasized. Rhode Island
still uses a modified form of common law pleading. Shanley v. Miletta, 93 R.I.
98, 171 A.2d 437 (1961); Ferla v. Rotella, 92 R.I. 460, 169 A.2d 906 170 A.2d
622 (1961).
" Mitchell v. McNabb, 58 Me. 506 (1870) (plaintiff erroneously sued in debt);
Van Santwood v. Sandford, 12 Johnson 197 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1815) (action of
covenant held improper); Kelly v. Lett, 35 N.C. 53 (1851) (action of case was
improper where the complaint was in trespass; discussion of election between
trespass and case).
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 2. Even under the Federal Rules it is often necessary to de-
termine the nature of the claim to determine the relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled. National Discount Corp. v. O'Mell, 194 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1952).
6 Thomas v. Camden Trust Co., 59 N.J. Super 142, 157 A.2d 355 (1959).
Generally, see C. CLARK, §§ 13-16 at 72-90.
"'2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2.01 et seq. at 302 et seq. (2d ed. 1967).
In summarizing Rule 2, Moore states: "Substantive rights remain unaltered. Pro-
cedurally, however, forms of action are immaterial." Id. 2.06[9] at 395. See
Blume, The Scope of a Ciil Action, 42 MICH. L. REV. 257 (1943).
8 53 N.Y. 211 (1873).
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The judge instructed the jury that damages were to be computed on the
basis of the highest price of the stock between the time of the sale by the
brokers and the trial of the case. On appeal, the court stated that this
instruction did not present the proper measure of damages, reversed the
judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered a new trial. In the course of its
discussion of what the court believed to be the proper rule of damages
in this type of case, the court remarked:
[T]he rule of damages should not depend upon the form of action. In
civil actions the law awards to the party injured a just indemnity for
the wrong which has been done him, and no more, whether the action
be in contract or tort; except in those special cases where punitory
damages are allowed, the inquiry must always be, what is an adequate
indemnity to the party injured, and the answer to that inquiry cannot
be affected by the form of the action in which he seeks his remedy.49
Such a sentiment has a ring of justice. For every factual situation
there is one measure of recovery. The plaintiff cannot change this
measure by a trick of pleading." Thus, equity actions have been said to
require the same measure of damages as would a law action brought on
"9 Id. at 220. A similar statement appears in United States Trust Co. v.
O'Brien, 143 N.Y. 284, 38 N.E. 266 (1894). Under the modern pleading rules,
these statements are technically accurate (and they are also meaningless) because
there is only one form of action. The idea of the Baker case has, however, been
carried over to modern practice with courts stating that the measure of damages
should not turn on the remedy plaintiff selects. This article suggests that such
statements are too broad in that the theory (or theories) around which a case is
tried or defended do affect the amount of recovery. This section does not sug-
gest that this theory must or should be stated in the pleading. When the theory
of the case or defense must be presented and the effect of having a theory are
separate problems. See City of Union City v. Murphy, 176 Ind. 597, 96 N.E. 584
(1911) ; C. CLARK, §43 at 259-65 (2d. 1947).
" "Hence, it is our conclusion that although plaintiff may select his remedy
when more than one are appropriate to the facts, yet he may not by doing so
change the measure of his recovery, from that fixed by the settled law as flowing
from the same acts. A contrary rule would render the law inconsistent by limiting
the measure of its relief to one litigant adopting one course of procedure and en-
larging the same character of relief to another or the same one, dependent upon
the remedy employed, and when both causes of action are based on the same facts;
and we are convinced that there should be no such uncertain rule." Falls Branch
Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 203 Ky. 307, 312-13, 262 S.W. 300, 303 (1924).
The plaintiff cannot convert a wrongful death action (tort) into a contract
action by pleading a contract cause of action in the complaint. See Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
On the right to bring a wrongful death or survival action based on breach of a
Code warranty, see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), overruled
in part in Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
17
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the same facts." Larger (or smaller) recoveries are not allowed simply
because the plaintiff is able to call upon a court's equitable powers.
The principal difficulty with an indiscriminate application of the
doctrine of Baker v. Drake is that for many factual patterns the courts
have said that there is more than one measure of what is "just indemnity"
for the wrong done. Facts are but segments of life and do not produce
any measure of recovery. Only as those facts are sorted out, some being
emphasized and others de-emphasized, and only as some legal policy is
applied to those facts (e.g., the policy of compensation, punishment, or
restoration), can a court begin to measure recovery. Thus, the theory
around which the facts are marshalled can become crucial in determining
how much money is required in order that the plaintiff receive a "just
indemnity." An example of this point can be found in the typical writ-
ten contract for the purchase and sale of land, in which the purchaser has
paid a part of the purchase price and the vendor has now refused to con-
vey the land to the purchaser. Such a factual pattern does not produce a
single remedy or a single measure of recovery. The purchaser may de-
cide not to pursue any damage remedy but seek specific performance. 2
Certainly, this "form" of action will affect his money award by reducing
damages otherwise recoverable.3 On the other hand, if the purchaser
"'Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Chandler, 287 F. 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1923) ("in as-
sessing damages, the rule is the same in courts of law and in courts of equity") ;
Christensen v. Slawter, 173 Cal. App. 2d 325, 343 P.2d 341 (1959). To the extent
that performance is required by the defendant the amount of damages recoverable
are, of course, decreased. Virginia Pub. Serv. Co. v. Steindler, 166 Va. 686, 187
S.E. 353 (1936).
Some courts have held that punitive damages will not be granted in an equity
action even though they might be awarded on the same facts in a law action.
Other courts, and perhaps the trend of the more recent decisions, have recognized
that equity courts may award punitive damages. Cases are collected in Annot., 48
A.L.R.2d 947 (1956).
" McCullough v. Newton, 348 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Mo. 1961) (a case also deal-
ing with the problem of the theory of the pleading filed by the purchaser, the court
finding no inconsistency between specific performance and the pleading: "A spe-
cific tract of real estate is treated as unique for the purpose of specific performance
of a contract to convey, 'irrespective of special facts showing the inadequacy of a
legal remedy.'"); Cummins v. Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1954); Gartrell v.
Stafford, 12 Neb. 545, 11 N.W. 732 (1882); Meyer v. Reed, 91 N.J. Eq. 237, 109
A. 733 (Ct. Ch. 1920); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922).
Cases are collected in 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1419 (Rev. ed. 1936, supp.
1968) (hereinafter cited S. WILLISTON).
"' McCreary v. Stallworth, 212 Ala. 238, 102 So. 52 (1924); Schneidau v.
Manley, 131 Conn. 285, 39 A.2d 885 (1944); Baker v. Puffer, 299 Ill. 486, 132
N.E. 429 (1921); Ratchesky v. Piscopo, 239 Mass. 180, 131 N.E. 449 (1921);
Stauch v. Daniels, 240 Mich. 295, 215 N.W. 311 (1927); Meineke v. Schwepe, 93
Ohio App. 111, 111 N.E.2d 765 (1952).
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wants damages, he has a number of alternatives: (1) he may seek the
loss of his bargain as measured by the difference between the market
value of the land and the unpaid contract price;4 (2) he may attempt to
recover expenses made in reliance on the contract;55 or (3) he may be
satisfied with a return of his down payment." The factual pattern gives
rise to several approaches to money recoveries and the theories around
which the purchaser sorts out and emphasizes certain of the facts affecting
the measure of his recovery.
Such a case is not unique. Vendors have similar choices when their
purchasers default. 7 Sellers (on default of their buyers) and buyers (on
default of their sellers) of goods have a choice among several remedies
under the Uniform Commercial Code. Their choice affects the dollars
which they may recover." On some occasions, the plaintiff also may
"Beck v. Staats, 80 Neb. 482, 114 N.W. 633 (1908). In some jurisdictions,
the purchaser may recover his loss of bargain only if the vendor acted in "bad
faith." Otherwise, the purchaser is limited to a recovery of his down payment
plus, possibly, other expenses such as the cost of searching title. Hammond v.
Hannin, 21 Mich. 374, 387 (1870).
" Cases are collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R. 12 (1927), s. 68 A.L.R. 137 (1930),
17 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1951); 5 S. WILLISTON § 1363A. For a discussion of this
measure of recovery, see Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (Pts. 1-2) 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
"Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573 (1897); Lemle v. Barry, 181 Cal. 6,
183 P. 148 (1919); Hall v. Sunberg, 72 Colo. 90, 209 P. 638 (1922); City of
Tarpon Springs v. Gerecter, 155 So. 2d 566 (Fla. App. 1963); Lodi v. Gayette,
219 Mass. 72, 106 N.E. 601 (1914); Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N.Y. 391, 59 N.E. 196
(1901); Rugg v. Midland Realty Co., 261 Pa. 453, 104 A. 685 (1918). See 5
S. WILLISTON § 1457.
The purchaser may, on default of the vendor, recover his down payment even
though it exceeds the value of the property to be conveyed. Wilkinson v. Ferree,
24 Pa. 190, 192-93 (1855).
There is also the possibility of treating the vendor as a "trustee" and, if the
vendor has sold the land to a good faith purchaser, recovering the amount re-
ceived on the sale (less any balance unpaid by the purchaser). Timko v. Useful
Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433; 168 A. 824 (Ct. Ch. 1933).
" Vendors, as a class, have a right to specific performance of contracts for
the sale of land. Freeman v. Paulson, 107 Minn. 64, 66-67, 119 N.W. 651, 652(1909). This right is sometimes rested on the doctrine of affirmative mutuality,
Spring v. Sanders, 62 N.C. 71, 72 (1866), although probably a better explanation
lies in the inadequacy of the legal remedy to determine damages and to provide ade-
quate protection of the interests of the vendor upon execution of a judgment
for full price. See McPeters v. English, 141 N.C. 491, 54 S.E. 417 (1906).
" See Part 7 of Article 2 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. The general
remedies of the seller are listed in UCC § 2-703; of the buyer, in UCC § 2-711.
" For example, the seller may, in an appropriate case, elect to sue for the full
price under UCC § 2-709, or the seller may resell the goods and, if he follows
the requirements of the Code, recover the difference between the resale and con-
tract prices. UCC § 2-706.
Under modern practice, the plaintiff has a right to elect his remedy and the
court cannot change the action chosen. Thomas v. Camden Trust Co., 59 N.J.
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choose between contract and tort measures of recovery when the activity
of the defendant can be classified as either a breach of a contract promise
or a tort.6" Therefore, the vendor-purchaser case, far from being unique,
is typical of the fact that damages may be influenced by the theory around
which the plaintiff presents the facts of his case. Thus, the approach to
the money recovery must be planned in each case with at least the same
care as is devoted to a determination of the substantive rights of the
parties.61
CONCLUSION
Courts and lawyers have not devoted nearly enough critical analysis
to the problems involved in determining the size of money recoveries.
Too often they have devoted their time and attention to the substantive
rules of liability, leaving the amount of recovery to rest on a myriad of
assumptions built on further untested assumptions. Those assumptions
merit testing, both as to their impact on the parties and on the economic
system in which they live.62 The tools available to the court now include
granting recoveries based upon notions of compensation, restitution, and
punishment. Indiscriminate use of these tools can produce arbitrary re-
sults in an area where sound economic policy is needed.
Super. 142, 157 A.2d 355 (Super. Ct. 1959). When, however, the measure of
damages sought by the plaintiff is, for some reason, inappropriate, and another
measure is proper, the court should grant the proper measure. See Oliver v.
Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273 P.2d 15 (1954).
"0 Often, the choice between a contract and a tort action is a difference between
a remedy (that is, some damages) and no remedy (that is, no damages). Dentists'
Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 119 N.Y.S.2d 570, aff'd.306 N.Y. 624,
116 N.E.2d 238 (1953), allowed the plaintiff to choose a remedy which was not
barred by the statute of limitations as against the tort remedy which was barred.
Where the defendant is immune to an action in tort, damages for breach of
contract may be recovered if the facts of the case also include a contract promise
which has been breached by the defendant. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Rd.
Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937). Damages in quasi-contract actions
have also been allowed. Hillsboro County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 138 So. 400,
144 So. 393 (1932); Nelson County v. Coleman, 126 Va. 275, 101 S.E. 413 (1913).
In these cases, the theory by which plaintiff presents his case affects his right
to damages.
There are, however, cases in which the court states that the measure of re-
covery is the same whether the theory of the case is tort or contract. Bowater v.
Worley, 57 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1932); Lastinger v. City of Adel, 69 Ga. App. 535,
26 S.E.2d 158 (1943); Billups v. American Surety Co., 173, Kan. 646, 251 P.2d
237 (1952). Generally, however, these statements are made in cases in which
the measure of damages is identical in contract and tort.
6" "When the complainant has the option to choose one of two alternative
remedies, she should be permitted to pursue that which is most complete, adequate
and expeditious." Plasman v. Roach, 43 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1949). See also, Lessard
v. Darker, 94 N.H. 209, 49 A.2d 814 (1946).
6 See Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: the Geom-
etry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49.
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